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Muslim Brides and the Ghost of the Shari’a: Have 
the Recent Law Reforms in Egypt, Tunisia and 
Morocco Improved Women’s Position in 
Marriage and Divorce, and Can Religious 
Moderates Bring Reform and Make It Stick? 
Yakaré-Oulé Jansen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Upon gaining independence, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia all started a process of 
law reform in the area of family law. 1 This resulted in a number of laws relating to family 
matters adopted in Egypt between the 1920’s and 1950’s.2 Morocco and Tunisia adopted 
a Code of Personal Status in 1957-1958 and 1956 respectively.3 Although Western law 
replaced shari’a in most areas, family law has remained the domain of traditional Islamic 
law. 4 This partly has to do with the central position the family has in the life of a Muslim, 
partly with tradition, and perhaps to a certain extent with resisting the influence of 
European legal systems and a recent reinforcement of religious fundamentalist voices.5 
All three countries have recently undergone significant law reforms, to which Tunisia is 
somewhat of an exception as it began with a fairly progressive legal framework.6  The 
aim of this article is to assess to what extent these law reforms have improved the 
position of women in family law, in particular women’s rights related to entering into 
marriage, the obligations during marriage and the ability to obtain divorce. 
¶2 In order to place the respective legislations in the proper context, this article first 
discusses the rules on marriage and divorce as prescribed by the Qur’an and sunna and 
how they compare to the rules in pre-Islamic Arabia. Naturally, the survey cannot amount 
to more than a general discussion, as examining the various views of the different schools 
                                                 
* LL.M., Columbia University School of Law, 2006; Meester in de Rechten (J.D./LL.B. equiv.) Dutch 
Civil Law, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2005; Meester in de Rechten (J.D./LL.B. equiv.) 
International & European Law, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2005. 
1 J. N. D. Anderson, Modern Trends in Islam Legal Reform and Modernisation in the Middle East, 20 INT’L 
& COMP . L.Q. 1, 1-21 (1971). 
2 Michele Brandt & Jeffrey A. Kaplan, The Tension Between Women’s Rights and Religious Rights: 
Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 105, 111-13 (1995-1996). 
3 Brandt & Kaplan, supra  note 2, at 128-31; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reform of Personal Status Laws in 
North Africa: A Problem of Islamic or Mediterranean Laws? , 49 MIDDLE E. J., 432, 432-46 (1995); 
MOUNIRA M. CHARRAD, STATES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: THE MAKING OF POSTCOLONIAL TUNISIA, 
ALGERIA AND MOROCCO 158-68, 215-32 (2001). 
4 Anderson, Modern Trends, supra  note 1, at 1. 
5 Brandt & Kaplan, supra  note 2, at 132. 
6 Brandt & Kaplan, supra  note 2, at 128-31; CHARRAD, supra  note 3, at 230; Nadia Hijab, Islam, Social 
Change and the Reality of Arab Women’s Lives, in ISLAM, GENDER, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 45, 46-47 
(Yvonne Y. Haddad & John L. Esposito eds., 1998).   
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of jurisprudence would amount to much too lengthy an expedition.  Before looking into 
the reforms that have taken place in each country, a brief survey is presented on the 
position of women under the respective constitutions as well as the obligations with 
respect to family law under the major international human rights treaties.  This is 
followed by a discussion of the reforms in the area of marriage and divorce and some 
comments on the possibility that reform on paper need not necessarily imply a change in 
day to day reality. 
II. THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT 
A. The Position of Women in the Qur’an 
¶3 The Qur’an introduced a great improvement of the position of women as opposed 
to the situation in pre-Islamic Arabia.7 Although pre-Islamic poetry and some other 
sources point to the occurrence of women who owned property, conducted business and 
independently arranged their own marriage,8 such as Muhammad’s first wife Khadijah, 
women were generally placed under the control of a father or husband.9 Under pre-
Islamic society, when married, a woman became the property of her husband and so did 
the children she would bear him.10  In exchange, her tribe would be paid a dower the price 
of which depended upon a woman’s virtue and chastity. 11 By marrying, the woman 
forfeited all inheritance rights within her own family which ensured that property could 
not be transferred outside the tribe.12 She did, however, maintain the right to protection by 
her blood relatives in case her husband mistreated her.13 Polygamy was unlimited and 
divorce did not entail any maintenance obligations.14  
¶4 The advent of Islam brought a shift in focus from the tribe as most important social 
unit to the family as the foundation of society. 15  Women were held to be equally 
responsible in preserving the family unit as men and therefore this shift entailed 
acknowledgement of their rights.16 An important change was that women now received 
their dower themselves, and not their father or other male relatives, changing women’s 
position from subject of the marriage contract to that of a legal partner.17 Polygamy was 
limited to a maximum of four wives, provided the husband was able to treat each wife in 
an equal manner.18 Divorce had to be followed by a waiting period in which 
reconciliation was possible and if that did not occur, provisions for maintenance could be 
                                                 
7 JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 12-14 (2001). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 13. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 14. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 23.  
18 Qur’an 4:3 (“ [M]arry women of your choice, two, or three, or four; but if [you] fear that [you] shall not 
be able to deal justly (with them), then only one […]”).  ABDULLAH YUSUF ALI, AN ENGLISH 
INTERPRETATION OF THE HOLY QUR’AN (2001). 
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made.19 Quranic inheritance rules allotted fixed shares of the property to designated heirs, 
including women who were excluded under the pre-Islamic system. 20 
¶5 Giving women full legal capacity to enter into civil transactions and to own 
property irrespective of their married status was a progressive step compared to the 
European-Christian21 laws, which until last century failed to give women their equal share 
of rights.22 For example, up to the 1960’s and 1970’s when the European codes were 
adjusted to fit modern time reality, French women needed permission from their husband 
to go to work.23  The Qur’an and the Islamic codes, discussed later on, may to some 
extent have lost their progressive edge since the Western codes developed further; 
however, what is currently considered to be the standard is the result of much more recent 
developments than is generally appreciated.24   
¶6 The distinction Islamic culture makes between men and women is generally taken 
as a given. 25 The compatibility between the condemnation of discrimination against 
women and the acknowledgement of certain (biological) differences is based on a 
classification on the basis of sex, stemming from what is considered men’s greater 
responsibilities as providers and protectors in society. 26  This may be understandable 
within a historical context, but it remains questionable whether this rationale can be 
applied with as much ease in modern day society. 27 In addition, such classifications can 
have a detrimental discriminating effect on women’s position within society. 28  
                                                 
19 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 25. 
20 Id. at 37-38. 
21 The Qur’an addresses men and women equally when speaking of their  rights, duties and obligations, 
while underlining that they are different by nature. The story of Creation is told in gender-neutral terms and 
the principle of equality often emphasized: “Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of you, be he 
male or female: [you] are members, one of another […],” Qur’an 3:195, and “to men is allotted what they 
earn, and to women what they earn [..],” Qur’an 4:32. The fourth sura of the Qur’an, the alNisa’, forms a 
special tribute to the particular rights and obligations of women. The New Testament takes a different 
approach, erasing the (sexual) difference between men and women: “There is […] neither slave nor free 
man, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.” Galatians 3:28, New AMERICAN 
STANDARD BIBLE (1995). An interesting connection can be made here with the ideal of celibacy within 
Christian religious culture, whereas celibacy is not encouraged Islam. See Mohammad Al-Moqatei, The 
Philosophy of Marriage in Islam 7 (Univ. of Warwick, Coventry, Working Paper, 1985). 
22 THE REFORM OF FAMILY LAw IN EUROPE (A.G. Chloros ed., 1978).  
23 See generally Jacques Foyer, The Reform of Family Law in France, in THE REFORM OF FAMILY LAW IN 
EUROPE, supra note 22, at 75-109.  For an interesting reflection on the development of family law in North 
Africa and France, see Mayer, supra note 3. 
24 See generally THE REFORM OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE, supra note 22. 
25 See generally LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN ISLAM (1992). 
26 See ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 132-34.  
27 With the increasing participation of women in the workforce as well as in politics, the traditional division 
of labor in which the man is the breadwinner and the woman takes care of the household can no longer be 
considered universally applicable.  
28 According to Amina Wadud, it is mistaken to read any general preference of men over women into the 
verses of the Qur’an. She argues that some verses have been repeatedly misinterpreted as stating an overall 
supremacy of man over woman, including verses on divorce (Qur’an 2:228, for example, which, according 
to Wadud, only provides an advantage to men over women with regard to divorce, not in general) and 
verses on the duties between husband and wife (Qur’an 4:34, for example, which is taken as allotting a 
double share of inheritance to men consequent to their responsibility to maintain women). See AMINA 
WADUD, QUR’AN AND WOMEN 66-74, 105 (1999). 
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B. Marriage  
¶7 Islam is a way of life, which regulates the personal, spiritual as well as the physical 
and social aspects of everyday life.29  Marriage is recommended by the Prophet 
Muhammad and described by him as the ‘perfection’ of one’s religion; 30 yet it is not a 
sacrament under Islamic law. 31 Marriage is a civil contract, legitimizing intercourse and 
procreation. 32 It is a contract with a high spiritual content, an obligation any good Muslim 
not financially or physically impaired should fulfill.33 Moreover, as briefly mentioned in 
the preceding paragraph, “[M]arriage, in Islam, is truly the foundation for the family; 
and, the family, in turn, is truly the foundation for the Islamic social system.”34 According 
to Islamic law scholar Mahmoud Hoballah, there are many legitimate reasons to get 
married35 but the most commonly referred to reason in the Qur’an is ’peace of mind’, 
‘ease of mind’ or ‘tranquility and quietude in the other.’36  
¶8 A marriage contract must satisfy certain requirements in order to be valid.37 First, 
the contracting parties must be of sound mind and free to act. There is no mention of an 
age suitable for marriage in the Qur’an, but under classical Islamic law, men are assumed 
to have attained puberty at the age of 12 and women at the age of 9.38 Men may contract 
their own marriage; women must typically have a guardian to act on their behalf. 39  An 
exception to this rule is the Hanafi40 school, which allows an adult woman to contract her 
                                                 
29 Mahmoud Hoballah, Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance in Islamic Law, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 24, 24 
(1953-1954). 
30 Id. at 24-25; Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 1. 
31 Islamic law or shari’a indicates the legal rules drawn from the Qur’an (the primary source of Islamic 
guidance, the word of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad), the sunna (the life examples and 
traditions by the Prophet), qiyas (the process of analogical reasoning allowing for Quranic  guidance in 
situations for which the Qur’an had not explicitly provided guidance) and ijma (the consensus of religious 
leaders). 
32 “Celibacy is frowned upon in Islam. […] The Islamic philosophy of marriage is that marriage is a natural 
way of life and the most sacred institution of Islam. The religion is against celibacy and monastic life and 
considers parenthood the duty of every human being. God creates animal life and gave the instincts with 
which they can continue the species. […] Not only is marriage a means of sensual enjoyment but it is also a 
commitment to life itself, to society and the means for survival of the human race.”  Al-Moqatei, supra note 
21, at 7, 13. 
33 See id.; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 14. 
34 Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 1. 
35 Hoballah, supra  note 29, at 26 (”Marriage may be contracted for one or all of the following purposes: the 
propagation of the human race; the unification of different people so as to create between them a bond of 
relationship which is not less if not more important than that of blood relationship; to cherish in man and 
woman a sense of responsibility which is particularly essential for human stability and progress; to develop 
in man and woman the feeling of respect and love, and to keep the character of both man and woman pure 
and clean.”). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 25. 
38 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 15. 
39 Id. 
40 The Hanafi school of thought was founded by Imam Abu Hanifa in the eight century A.D. The school 
often favors the position of men in matters of divorce and does not easily allow for additional clauses in the 
marriage contract. There are three other schools of fiqh (jurisprudence) within Sunni Islam: the Maliki, 
Hanbali and Shafi’i schools, founded in the eighth and ninth century A.D. by Imams Malik ibn Anas, 
Ahmad bin Hanbal and  Muhammad bin Idris al-Shafi'i, respectively.  They offer varying degrees of 
flexibility with respect to the insertion of clauses in the marriage contract and grounds for divorce. 
Generally, the Shafi’i school is considered the most conservative.     
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own marriage, provided this is with a man of equal social status.41 According to some 
Hanafi jurists, failure to demand a proper dower or the husband’s negligence in paying it 
allows for the guardian to have the marriage dissolved.42  
¶9 Second, there should be no impediment of relationship or religion which would 
interdict marriage between the parties. Under Hanafi law, a man may marry either a 
Muslim woman or a scriptural non-Muslim woman, meaning that she can be either 
Jewish or Christian. 43 She can continue to practice her religion.  Aside from religious 
difference, certain degrees of kinship bar a valid marriage as well.44 
¶10 Third, the contract may not be limited in time.45 In pre-Islamic Arabia it was 
possible to conclude temporary marriages (mutah), but within the context of Islam, 
marriage is intended as a permanent institution. 46  
¶11 Fourth, the essential offer (ijab) by the one party and acceptance (qabul) by the 
other must take place before at least two male witnesses.47 An engagement is not legally 
binding and can be broken off without any legal implications, although from an Islamic 
point of view a promise made is a moral obligation and should be fulfilled.48  
¶12 Finally, the wife must be given a dower.49 The purpose of the dower is to safeguard 
the economic position of the wife after marriage “so that she is not prevented for lack of 
money from defending her rights.”50 The dower is an essential element of the contract; a 
marriage contract that stipulates the absence of a dowry is not valid.51 The dower is the 
                                                 
41 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 15, 21 (stating that equality is determined by family, Islam, profession, 
freedom, good character and means).  
42 Id. 
43 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 19. According to Al-Moqatei, a Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim 
under any circumstances. Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 12. 
44 One cannot marry an ascendant or a descendant, or a brother or sister or their descendants. It does not 
matter whether these brothers and sisters are sanguine or half-brothers and –sisters. One also cannot marry 
the brothers or sisters of one’s ascendants, a mother- or father-in-law, stepson or –daughter or a foster 
father or mother. Also, it is prohibited to have as co-wives women who are sisters or who would otherwise 
be prohibited from marrying if one of them were male. Qur’an 4:23; Hoballah, supra note 29, at 26; 
ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 19-20. 
45 Hoballah, supra note 29, at 25. 
46 Shiite jurists disagree and do not consider the temporary marriage to be forbidden (haram).  See, e.g., 
Temporary Marriage in Islamic Law, http://www.al-islam.org/al-serat/muta (last visited Apr. 2, 2007). 
47 One male witness can be replaced by two female witnesses: “And get two witnesses, out of your own 
men. And if there are not two men, then a man and two women, such as [you] choose for witnesses, so that 
if one of them errs, the other can remind her.” Qur’an 2:282. The justification for this “two women for one 
man” rule is that due to the strict division of labor in traditional Islamic society, women, who were 
confined to domestic matters, were considered to lack the worldly savvy and experience of men and 
therefore less competent to bear witness. ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 16 and 47. Even if applicable to 
matters of business, this rule appears questionable when it comes to matters such as marriage; considering 
women’s focus on household, family and the domestic domain, one could argue that they would be the 
witness par excellence for such occasions. Wadud interprets the passage more positively in the context of 
the time of revelation of the Qur’an, and points out that “[e]ven at the time of severe social, financial, and 
experiential constraints, the Qur’an recognized the potential of women’s resources.” WADUD, supra  note 
28, at 86.  “Despite the social constraints, [. . .] a woman was nevertheless considered a potential witness.” 
Id. 
48 Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 9.  
49 Hoballah, supra note 29, at 25, ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 23. 
50 Al-Moqatei, supra  note 21, at 10. 
51 This does not mean that when the dowry is not mentioned or a man does not pay the dower in time, the 
marriage contract is void. See Hoballah, supra note 29, at 25. The wife maintains the right to claim her 
dower and he remains under obligation to pay it. Id. If no dower is mentioned or determined, she can claim 
the dowry of a woman of equal position and he will be obliged to pay accordingly. Id. Also, different types 
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wife’s personal property. 52  She is not required to share or use it to contribute to the 
household, but she may do so if she chooses.53 
¶13 The number of marriages a person can enter into is limited.54  Polyandry (several 
husbands for one woman) is not allowed under Islamic law, polygyny (several wives for 
one husband) is.55 Hereinafter the more commonly used term “polygamy” will be used. 
Polygamy is limited to a maximum of four wives, provided that the husband is capable of 
treating all wives equally, both in provisions and in kindness.56 The possibility of having 
several wives regulated an existing practice under pre-Islamic customary law, 57 and was 
originally intended to solve certain social problems, such as the care for widows and 
orphans after the death of many men in warfare.58 Although it is stated to not have been 
intended for “the satisfaction of anyone’s sexual desires,”59 some authors appear to 
coincidentally see it as the perfect solution for venereal disease and adultery. 60 
C. Rights and Obligations in Marriage 
¶14 According to the Qur’an, women “have rights similar to the [husbands’] rights 
against them.”61  The wife’s rights are considered the counterpart of the husband’s 
obligation of maintenance.62 This obligation of maintenance entails both material aspects, 
such as adequate housing, clothing and food as well as a right to general care and well-
being. 63 In addition to the previously discussed right to a dower, the woman can secure 
certain further rights by means of stipulations in the marriage contract under Hanbali 
law. 64 This can be done at the moment of its conclusion or afterwards.65 These 
                                                                                                                                                 
of dowers can be agreed upon, either prompt or deferred. See A l-Moqatei, supra  note 21, at 11. 
52 See Qur’an 4:4: “And give the women (on marriage) their dower as an obligation; but if they, of their 
own good pleasure, remit any part of it to you, take it and enjoy it with right good cheer.” 
53 Id. M. Abu Zahra, Family Law, in LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 132, 142-43 (M. Khadduri & H. Liebesny 
eds., 1955); Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 11. 
54 Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 17; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 19. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. 
57 See supra Part II.A and II.B. 
58 Relevant at the time was the Battle of Uhud in 625 A.D., which caused the death of a great percentage of 
Muslim men, leaving an accordingly great number of widows and orphans. Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 
16. 
59 Hoballah, supra note 29, at 27. 
60 Al-Moqatei, supra note 21,at 14: “[P]olygamy is one of the most important [principles] in Islamic law, 
because [it] solves very comp licated social problems . . . Whereas most of the societies of today are 
suffering from adultery and veneral [sic] disease and cannot find solutions for these problems, no such 
problems exist in Islam. Modern societies still have a problem even if they use the “boyfriend and 
girlfriend” or fiancée relationship. There is also the problem in monogamous societies where there is 
adultery in the case of men deceiving their wives with sweethearts.”  
61 Qur’an 2:228. However, the same verse states that “men have a degree over them.” Id.  See also supra 
notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
62 See Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 11. 
63 Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 11; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 25. 
64  ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 22. The practical use of this option may be limited if it is not the woman 
herself who contracts the marriage. She may either be too young and inexperienced to grasp the scope of 
her duties under marriage or the person negotiating the contract for her may not want to pay attention to 
any wishes she may express on this matter. Amending the contract at a later stage would require the 
consent of both parties, which may be difficult. Thus, what may seem to be an equitable arrangement in 
principle may not be so in practice due to inequality in bargaining power. 
65 Id. 
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stipulations could include the prohibition of the man to take a second wife or the right of 
the woman to work outside the home.66 The only condition is that they are not contrary to 
the object of marriage.67 Such clauses are void, but leave the marriage contract itself 
intact.68 As mentioned before, the Qur’an enabled women to own property69 and neither 
partner acquires a right in the spouse’s property upon marriage.70  
¶15 In return for the husband’s obligation to maintenance, the wife has the obligation to 
maintain a good household, care for the children and be faithful and obedient to her 
husband.71 The husband is allowed to restrict his wife’s liberty of movement (for as far as 
his freedom to do so has not been limited by stipulations in the marriage contract) and to 
determine which visitors she may and may not receive.72 She must maintain an attractive 
appearance for him and may not “deny herself to her husband.”73 
D. Divorce 
¶16 Muhammad is reported to have said that “of all permitted things, divorce is the 
most abominable with God.”74 But, as marriage is a contract and the forced cohabitation 
of two people who cannot live together in harmony would be even more harmful to these 
individuals, as well as to the purpose of marriage within society as such, there are ways 
of dissolving a failed marriage under Islamic law. 75 Divorce is not to be resolved upon 
until all attempts to reconciliation have been made.76 To this end, a window of 
opportunity for the partners to reconcile is left during a certain period of time.77 
¶17 Even though the Qur’an repeatedly makes clear that divorce is reprehensible and 
against the will of God, divorce can be sought when a couple can no longer live together 
as husband and wife.78 This is a very broad definition, leaving it open to the interpretation 
of jurists to define what type of marital discord could be grounds for divorce.79 The 
pronouncement of talaq (repudiation) by the husband must indicate an intention to 
divorce, along the lines of “you are divorced” or “I have divorced you.”80 The actual 
intent does not necessarily have to agree with the verbal meaning.81  
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 Id. Thus, a party may not contract around the obligation of a husband to maintain his wife. Id.  
68 Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 139-40; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 22-23. 
69 See Qur’an 4:7: “From what is left by parents and those nearest related there is a share for men and a 
share for women, whether the property be small or large, — a determinate share.” 
70 Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 140; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 23. 
71 See Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality 
Rights of Women: An Analysis under the United Nations Charter, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 271, 282-
324 (1997). A wife’s mandatory obedience to her husband is a doctrine common to fundamentalism in all 
five major religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism. Id.  
72 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 22. 
73 Al-Moqatei, supra  note 21, at 12. 
74 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 27. 
75 Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 145; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 28. 
76 Hoballah, supra note 29, at 27. 
77 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 30. 
78 Hoballah, supra note 29, at 27. 
79 Id. at 28. 
80 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 29. 
81 Id. 
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¶18 The talaq can be either revocable, which would allow a husband to reconcile with 
his wife, or irrevocable, which means that certain conditions need to be fulfilled before 
reconciliation is possible.82 A man can divorce his wife and reconcile with her two times; 
the third divorce becomes irrevocable and the man can only marry his ex-wife again after 
she has remarried, consummated the marriage and then was legally divorced or became a 
widow. 83 The idea is that this will prevent the man from divorcing his wife frivolously 
and was a response to the pre-Islam practices in Arabia in which the repeated divorcing 
and remarrying of wives was used to push women into buying their final freedom by 
relinquishing their dower.84 Talaq pronounced before the marriage was consummated is 
irrevocable as well.85 
¶19 A revocable divorce remains so only for a specific period of time, the iddah.86 The 
purpose of the iddah is to allow for reconciliation and to ascertain whether the wife is 
pregnant or not.87 If the marriage was consummated, this period will take the time of 
three menstrual cycles.88 If she is pregnant, the iddah continues until she gives birth. 89 
The declaration of talaq should be made only during the period of thur, the time when the 
woman is not menstruating, and is valid only if a husband has not had sexual relations 
with his wife.90  
¶20 The form of divorce in which talaq is uttered three consecutive times in order to 
become irrevocable is disapproved.91 “I divorce you; I divorce you; I divorce you” goes 
against Quranic prescriptions,92 but the only safeguard or restriction provided for its use 
is the man’s conscience and God’s punishment in the hereafter.93 
¶21 The Qur’an confers basic rights of divorce upon the wife as well, but in practice 
her ability to obtain one is very limited.94 One option is the delegated divorce, or talaq al-
tafwid, in which the woman is delegated the power to divorce by her husband (“divorce 
yourself”).95 Another option is to have the marriage dissolved by a judge upon petition by 
the wife.96 In contrast to the husband, who is not required to state any grounds for his 
decision to divorce, Muslim jurists allow the wife to file her petition only in limited 
                                                 
82 Qur’an 2:229 (“A divorce is only permis sible twice; after that, the parties should either hold together on 
equitable terms, or separate with kindness.”); ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 31, 37. 
83 See Qur’an 2:229 and 2:230 (“So if a husband divorces his wife (irrevocably), he cannot, after that, re-
marry her until after she has married another husband and he has divorced her.”); see also  Abu Zahra, 
supra note 53, at 148; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 37. 
84 See Qur’an 2:229; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 31; Hoballah, supra note 29, at 29. 
85 Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 147-48. 
86 See Qur’an 2:228, ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 30. 
87  ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 20, 34. 
88 “Such of your women as have passed the age of monthly courses, for them the prescribed period, if [you] 
have any doubts, is three months, and for those who have no courses (it is the same): for those who are 
pregnant, their period is until they deliver their burdens […].” Qur’an 65:4. 
89 Id. 
90 Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 147; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 30-31. 
91 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 31. 
92 “When [you] do divorce women, divorce them at their prescribed periods, and count (accurately) their 
prescribed periods: and fear Allah your Lord: and turn them not out of your houses […].” Qur’an 65:1. 
93 Id.; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 31. 
94 See Qur’an 2:228. 
95 This authorization could have been given at the time of conclusion of the marriage contract, or later on 
during the marriage. See Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 146. 
96 Id. 
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circumstances.97 There is no consensus among the Sunni schools of jurisprudence on 
which specific grounds have to be submitted.98 The most liberal is the Maliki99 school, 
allowing divorce on the grounds of cruelty, refusal of maintenance, desertion or a serious 
disease or ailment on the husband’s side that would be potentially harmful to the wife.100 
The most restrictive is the Hanafi school, which allows divorce only on grounds of 
physical defects,101 and the absence or incapacity of the man to consummate the 
marriage.102 One should note here in particular that under the Hanafi school 
noncompliance with the main duty of the husband in marriage—maintaining his wife—is 
not mentioned as grounds for divorce.103  
¶22 Divorce by mutual consent is possible at the wife’s instigation if she is able to buy 
her freedom.104  She can do so by paying her husband a sum of money, or by 
relinquishing part (or all) of the dower that has not yet been paid.105 This payment is not 
prescribed, the Qur’an even explicitly forbids men from pushing their wives into divorce 
by treating them badly and thus getting back some of the dower.106 Mutual divorce on 
instigation of both husband and wife is possible as well.107 The man then proposes 
dissolution and the woman accepts it.108 This type of divorce is irrevocable.109 
¶23 Finally, pursuant to the Hanafi teachings, when a woman renounces Islam and 
converts to another religion, the bond of marriage is dissolved automatically.110 For 
women lacking the means to redeem themselves from an undesirable marriage and the 
possibility to have their marriage annulled by a judge, this can be the last resort.111 
                                                 
97 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 33-34. 
98 See id. at 35. 
99 The Malik school of thought is generally considered to be quite progressive in the area of divorce. When 
it comes to marriage on the other hand, women may have their marriages arranged against their consent, 
even as adults, unless they have been married once before. See id. at 33-34. 
100 Id.  
101 According to the Hanafi school, the marriage can be irregular for a number of reasons, such as the 
conclusion of a marriage with a new wife when the former one is still in her period of iddah. Id. Other 
grounds for divorce recognized by the Hanafi school are if the parties are prohibited from marriage by 
fosterage, the marriage was contracted by non-Muslims who subsequently adopted Islam, or Muslims who 
subsequently forsake the Islamic religion, or the mere exercise of the option of dissolution by a party 
capable of doing so. Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. Hanafi jurists do say that a husband can be compelled to pay maintenance or even be imprisoned if 
he continues his refusal. 
104 “It is not lawful for you, (men), to take back any of your gifts (from your wives), except when both 
parties fear that they would be unable to keep the limits ordained by Allah if [you] (judges) do indeed fear 
that they would be unable to keep the limits […], there is no blame on either of them if she give something 
for her freedom […].” Qur’an 2:229. See also ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 32; Hoballah, supra note 29, at 
29. 
105 See Hoballah, supra note 29, at 29. 
106 See Qur’an 4:19 (“Nor should [you] treat them with harshness, that [you] may take away part of the 
dower [you] have given them […]”). 
107 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 32. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 34. 
111 Id. at 34, 79. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 0 7  
 
 190
E. Consequences of Divorce 
¶24 As previously mentioned,112 husband and wife do not obtain a legal interest in the 
other person’s property upon marriage, so each party leaves with their pre-marital 
property.113 Whether or not the wife keeps her dower after divorce depends mainly on 
whether the marriage has been consummated.114 If the marriage was not consummated, 
she may receive part of the dower or a “suitable gift”.115 When the marriage has been 
consummated, she is to keep her dower irrespective of who instigated the divorce.116 The 
wife also has a right to maintenance during the period of iddah.117 If she is pregnant, her 
maintenance rights continue until childbirth. 118 When the wife has a young child, the 
father must maintain both her and the child during the two years that she is nursing. 119  
¶25 Children are generally considered to be better off with their mothers until males are 
seven years old and females are nine years old.120 According to the Hanafi school, the 
children, regardless of age, should go to the family of the father if the woman remarries, 
displays “immoral” behavior, or takes care of the child in a poor manner.121 A prominent 
scholar, John Esposito, points out that the family emphasizes the paternal line of ancestry, 
thus the children “belong” more to the father than to the mother.122 This leaves women, 
“whose roles of wife and mother [are] the main source of a woman’s status in a 
traditional society” at risk of having their children taken away from them “even though 
[they were given] no choice in the divorce action.”123  
III. THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
¶26 In order to provide a legal context in which to place the comparison of the current 
and former laws of personal status, this article will first briefly discuss the constitutions 
of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia as well as these countries’ obligations under international 
law. This is not intended as a comprehensive discussion of all relevant issues; this section 
is focused on aspects related to religion and equality for men and women within the 
respective constitutions as well as the obligations pertaining to equality and the family as 
codified in the most important human rights treaties.124 In particular the issues of 
                                                 
112 See supra Part II.A and II.B. 
113 Abu Zahra, supra note 53, at 140; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 23. 
114 See Qur’an 2:236 and 2: 237  (“There is no blame on you if [you] divorce women before consummation 
or the fixation of their dower; but bestow on them (a suitable gift), the wealthy according to his means, and 
the poor according to his means [...] And if [you] divorce them before consummation, but after the fixation 
of a dower for them, then the half of the dower (is due to them), unless they remit it [...]”); ESPOSITO, supra 
note 7, at 35. 
115 Qur’an 2:236 and 2: 237; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 35. 
116  ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 35. 
117 See Qur’an 2:233; ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 36. 
118 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 36. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 35. 
121 Id. at 36. 
122 Id. at 36. This is also why under Islamic law children cannot take on the nationality of their mother, if 
different from the father. 
123 Id.  
124 See, e.g., the U.N. Charter (1945), available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/; The International 
Bill of Human Rights (1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm (consisting of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
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international human rights and Islamic law as well as the permissibility of reservations to 
human rights treaties could call for a far more extensive discussion than is provided 
here.125 But as this will quickly lead us into the heart of a cultural relativism discourse 
and the aim of this article is to provide an analysis of the recent law reforms, this article 
will not digress too much on the topic. 
A. The Constitutions 
¶27 Egypt adopted its first constitution in 1923 and revised it in 1971, 1980 and 2005.126 
Article 2 of the constitution declares that Islam is the State religion and Islamic 
jurisprudence the principal source of legislation. 127 Of all three constitutions, the Egyptian 
constitution is the only one that mentions both equality and family life.128 The principle of 
equality is first mentioned in article 8, in which equal opportunity for all citizens is 
guaranteed by the State.129 Article 40 declares all citizens equal before the law, bearing 
equal public rights and duties without discrimination on grounds of sex, ethnic origin, 
language, religion or creed.130 The Egyptian family as “the basis of the society founded 
on religion, morality and patriotism” is described in article 9 of the constitution. 131 Under 
article 11 the Egyptian State is to guarantee a proper coordination of a woman’s duty 
towards her family and her duties towards society. 132 In the fields of political, social, 
                                                                                                                                                 
(ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)); The United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) G.A. 
Res. 180,  U.N. GAOR, 34th  Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Sept. 3, 1981), available at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
125 See Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women’s Rights, 12 AM U.J. INT’L L. 
& POL’Y 1 (1997); Joelle Entelis, International Human Rights: Islam’s Friend of Foe?, 20 FORDHAM INT’L 
L. J. 1251 (1997); Mashmood A. Baderin, Human Rights and Islamic Law: The Myth of Discord , 2 EUR. 
HUM. RTS. L.R. 165 (2005) (discussing the compatibility of Islamic law with international human rights); 
see Bassam Tibi, Islamic Law/ Shari’a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations, 16 
HUM. RTS. Q. 277 (1994); Christina M. Cerna, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: 
Implementing Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 740 (1994); Heiner 
Bielefeldt, Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 587, 601 (1995); Reza Afshari, 
An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human Rights, 16 Hum. Rts. Q. 235 (1994) 
(discussing the incompatibility or need to redefine human rights doctrine within the Islamic framework); 
see also  infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (discussing the permissibility of reservations with 
respect to treaties). 
126 Egypt State Information Service, Political System, 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Pub/yearbook/yearbook2005/110103000000000019.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 
2007). 
127 DUSTUR JUMHURIYYAT MISR AL-ARABIYYA [Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt], ch. 1, art. 2, 
available at http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/constitution/index.asp (English translation) [hereinafter 
EGYPT CONST .]. 
128 Id. at ch. 2, arts. 8-9 and ch. 3, art. 40. 
129 Id. at ch. 2, art. 8 (“The State shall guarantee equality of opportunity to all citizens”). 
130 Id. at ch. 3, art. 40 (“All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties 
without discrimination between them due to sex, ethnic origin, language, religion or creed.”).  A 
noteworthy peculiarity is that the Arabic word jins is often found translated as “race.” The word means 
gender or “the nature of things.” The mistake is all the more odd since the article mentions “ethnic origin” 
explicitly, which arguably would include race.  
131 Id. at ch. 2, art. 9 (“The family is the basis of the society founded on religion, morality and patriotism. 
The State is keen to preserve the genuine character of the Egyptian family-with what it embodies of values 
and traditions—while affirming and developing this character in the relations within the Egyptian 
society.”). 
132 Id. at art. 11. 
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cultural and economic life she should be considered equal with men, but without 
violation of “the rules of Islamic jurisprudence.”133 
¶28 Morocco’s constitution was first enacted in 1972 and subsequently revised in 1992 
and 1996.134 In its preamble it has a noticeable reference to the adherence to international 
human rights as “arising from” the charters of international organizations.135 Article 6 
declares Islam to be the State religion and guarantees freedom of worship for all. 136 In 
article 5 general equality before the law of all Moroccan citizens is promulgated137 and 
article 8 states that men and women shall enjoy equal political rights, including the right 
to vote.138 
¶29 The oldest constitution is that of Tunisia. First enacted in 1959, it was revised 
several times since, latest in 2002.139 The preamble makes both a United Nations Charter 
style reference to the “common heritage of peoples attached to human dignity, justice and 
liberty”140 and a reference to adherence to Islam. 141 Article 1 declares that Islam is the 
State religion. 142 That the president must be a Muslim is codified in article 38.143 
According to article 6, all citizens are equal before the law and have equal rights and 
obligations.144 However, these rights can only be enjoyed within the boundaries set by 
law and in so far as their enjoyment is not restricted by a law enacted for the protection of 
certain purposes.145 These include the protection of others, the respect for the public 
order, the national defense, the development of the economy, and social progress.146 
                                                 
133 Id. (“The State shall guarantee the proper coordination between the duties of woman towards the family 
and her work in the society, considering her equal with man in the fields of political, social, cultural and 
economic life without violation of the rules of Islamic jurisprudence.”). 
134 Law and Religion Program Emory University, Islamic Family Law: Possibilities of Reform Through 
Internal Initiatives, http://www.law.emory.edu/IFL/index2.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2007). 
135 DUSTUR AL-MAMLAKA AL-MAGHRIBIYYA [Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco],  available at 
http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm  (English translation) [hereinafter MOROCCO CONST .] 
(“Aware of the need of incorporating its work within the frame of the international organizations of which 
it has become an active and dynamic member, the Kingdom of Morocco fully adheres to the principles, 
rights and obligations arising from the charters of such organizations, as it reaffirms its determination to 
abide by the universally recognized human rights.“) 
136 Id. at art. 6 (“Islam shall be the State religion. The State shall guarantee freedom of worship for all.”). 
137 Id. at art. 5 (“All Moroccan citizens shall be equal before the law.”). 
138 Id. at art. 8 (“Men and women shall enjoy equal political rights. Any citizen of age enjoying his or her 
civil and political rights shall be eligible to vote.”). 
139 United Nations Development Program, Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, Democratic 
Governance, Constitution, Tunisia, http://www.pogar.org/countries/constitution.asp?cid=20#sub7 (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2007). 
140 DUSTUR AL-JUMHURIYYA AL-TUNISIYYA [Constitution of the Tunisian Republic],  available at 
http://www.jurisitetunisie.com/tunisie/codes/constitution/menup.html (French translation) [hereinafter 
TUNIS. CONST .].  For an English translation, see the University of Richmond, The Constitution of Tunisia, 
http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Tunisiaconstitution.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2007) (“[T]o 
consolidate national unity and to remain faithful to human values which constitute the common heritage of 
peoples attached to human dignity, justice, and liberty, and working for peace, progress, and free 
cooperation between nations[…]”). 
141 Id. (“[T]o remain faithful to the teachings of Islam, to the unity of the Greater Maghreb, to its 
membership of the Arab family, to cooperation with the African peoples in building a better future, and 
with all peoples who are struggling for justice and liberty […]”). 
142 Id. at art. 1 (“Tunisia is a free State, independent and sovereign; its religion is the Islam, its language is 
Arabic, and its form is the Republic.”). 
143 Id. at art. 38 (“The President of the Republic is the Head of the State. His religion is Islam.”). 
144 Id. at art. 6 (“All citizens have the same rights and the same duties. They are equal before the law.”). 
145 Id. at art. 7 (“The citizens exercise the plenitude of their rights in the forms and conditions established 
by the law. The exercise of these rights cannot be limited except by a law enacted for the protection of 
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B. The UN Charter and the International Bill of Human Rights 
¶30 On grounds of the United Nations Charter (“Charter”) all member nations of the 
United Nations (“UN”) – including Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia – are bound by the 
minimum standards with respect to human rights as set out in the Charter.147 The Charter 
mentions women’s equality alongside the promotion of international peace and 
security. 148 Article 56 of the Charter states the pledge of all Member States to take joint 
and separate action for the achievement of the observance of human rights without 
distinction on the grounds of sex as embodied in article 55(c).149  This means that there is 
both a duty to cooperate with the UN in observing and promoting human rights, and that 
Member States may not undermine the object and purpose of the Charter by their 
actions.150   
¶31 Which human rights exactly enjoy protection under the Charter can be subject to 
debate.151 The narrowest interpretation acknowledges only those rights that are 
considered ius cogens, thus those norms prohibiting genocide, slavery, the murder or 
disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination 
(apartheid).152 However, it can be argued that it also includes the prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of sex, considering the consistent promulgation of this 
principle by the UN and affirmations by its Member States.153 
¶32 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) is clear about the rights of 
men and women with regard to marriage:  men and women “are entitled to equal rights as 
to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.”154 Under international law, however, 
this is not synonymous with identical treatment in every case; distinctions that are 
reasonable, just, proportionate, and based on objective criteria are permitted.155 
¶33 The Charter makes no connection between religion and human rights, except for 
the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion. 156 This prohibition is listed on 
                                                                                                                                                 
others, the respect for the public order, the national defense, the development of the economy, and social 
progress.”). 
146 Id. 
147 Howland, supra note 71, at 327. 
148 U.N. Charter pmbl., supra note 124 (“[R]eaffirm faith in fundamental rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small […]”).  
149 Id. at art. 56 (“[P]ledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization 
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in article 55”); see id. at art. 55(c) (“[U]niversal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion.”). 
150 Howland, supra note 71, at 328. 
151 Id. at 332-40. 
152 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Vol. 2, § 702. Ius 
cogens norms are international customary law rules recognized by the international community from which 
no derogation is possible.  States cannot conclude (international) agreements counter to these norms. 
Universal jurisdiction as well as international criminal liability is attached to these norms as the violation is 
considered to shock the conscience of the international community to the greatest extent. Id.  
153 See Howland, supra note 71, at 334-35 (referring to, among others, the Beijing Declaration and Platform 
for Action, paragraph 94). 
154 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217A, at art. 16, § 1, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. 
mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm [hereinafter 
UDHR]. 
155 Howland, supra note 71at 343. 
156 Id. at 329-30. 
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equal footing with other forbidden criteria such as race and sex; therefore religion does 
not have privileged protection in comparison to other grounds on which discrimination 
may occur.157 
¶34 The goal of the UDHR is to secure the observance of the rights enumerated in it for 
all peoples regardless of gender, race, sex or nationality. 158 “All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights,” according to article 1, and article 2 states that 
everyone is entitled to the rights in the UDHR without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, sex or religion. 159  Men and women are both entitled to equal recognition before the 
law and to equal protection of the law without discrimination. 160 
¶35 Article 16(1) declares that men and women of legal age are entitled to equal 
rights161 in marriage, during marriage and with respect to divorce.162 Limitations on the 
rights embodied in the UDHR are only allowed for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and when meeting the “just 
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare of a democratic 
society.”163  The mention of religion in the UDHR was expressly rejected by the 
drafters.164 
¶36 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) further 
elaborate on the principles embodied in the Charter and UDHR. 165 All three countries 
have signed and ratified both treaties.166 Egypt signed both covenants in 1967 and ratified 
them in 1982.167 Morocco did the same in 1977 and 1979 respectively, and Tunisia signed 
both treaties in 1968 with ratification following one year later.168 Morocco and Tunisia 
signed and ratified both treaties without making any declarations or reservations.169 
¶37 Each covenant states in its preamble that all enumerated rights are applicable to 
men and women in equal fashion. 170  The ICCPR compels States Parties to ensure the 
                                                 
157 Id. 
158 UDHR pmbl., supra  note 154. 
159 Id. at arts. 1, 2. 
160 Id. at arts. 6, 7. 
161 Id. at art. 16, § 1; see also  Howland, supra  note 71, at 343 (on the concept of “equal rights” under 
international law). 
162 UDHR pmbl., supra  note 154, at art. 16, § 1 (“Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to 
race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights 
as to marriage, during marriage and at is dissolution.”). 
163 Id. at art. 29, § 2. 
164 See Howland, supra note 71, at 341. The proposal came from two Christian Member States, Brazil and 
the Netherlands. Id.  
165 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR] and International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm [hereinafter ICESCR]; infra notes 170-76 and 
accompanying text. 
166 For the status of signatures, ratifications and reservations, see the website of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification (last 




170 ICCPR, supra  note 165, pmbl. (“[U]ndertaking to ensure equal rights of men and women to enjoy all 
civil and political rights recognized [in the ICCPR]”); ICESCR, supra  note 165, pmbl. (“[U]ndertaking to 
ensure equal rights of men and women to enjoy all economic, social and cultural rights in [the ICESCR]”). 
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equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set out in 
the Covenant.171 This means equality before the law as prescribed in article 26172 and 
equality of marital rights, rights during marriage and in divorce under article 23(4).173 
Article 3 of the ICESCR mirrors the same article of the ICCPR by stating that parties to 
the Covenant should ensure “the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all 
economic, social and cultural rights [set forth in the Covenant].”174 What follows is 
mostly an elaboration on the rights to employment and education, but in article 10(1) the 
family is mentioned.175 According to this article, “[t]he widest possible protection and 
assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental group 
unit of society […]. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending 
spouses.”176 
¶38 As mentioned above, Morocco and Tunisia signed the covenants without making 
any declaration or reservation. 177 Egypt made a general declaration upon ratification of 
both treaties, stating that: “[T]aking into consideration the provisions of the Islamic 
Shari’a and the fact that they do not conflict with the text annexed to the instrument, we 
accept, support and ratify it […].”178 It has been called into question whether religious 
reservations to treaties are compatible with obligations under the UN Charter and perhaps 
the same question could be raised with respect to such declarations.179 
C. CEDAW 
¶39 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women180 (“CEDAW”) is the most progressive and comprehensive international 
instrument dealing with women’s rights, and at the same time one of the most heavily 
reserved human rights treaties.181 CEDAW takes its provisions from the International Bill 
of Human Rights, applies them to women, and while doing so tries not only to regulate 
State behavior, but also that of private entities.182 CEDAW also explicitly states that one 
of its aims is the eradication of sexual stereotypes in both the public and private sphere.183  
                                                 
171 ICCPR, supra  note 165, at art. 3. 
172 Id. at art. 26 (stating that law “shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection against discrimination”).   
173 ICCPR, supra  note 165, at art. 3, § 4 (“States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps 
to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution.”). 
174 ICESCR, supra  note 165, at art. 3. 
175 Id. art. 10, § 1. 
176 Id. 
177 See Website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 166. 
178 See id.  
179 Howland, supra note 71, at 371-74. 
180 CEDAW, supra note 124.  
181 For a list of declarations, reservations and objections to CEDAW, see the website of the Department for 
the Advancement of Women of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007). 
182 Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict 
Resolution, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 795, 799-801 (1992). Of course, this argument can be made for a 
number of rights codified in the International Bill of Human Rights as well, for example on the basis of the 
concept of drittwirkung, or third party applicability, of human rights. The argument has been used, amongst 
others, to make international human rights norms applicable to multinational corporations in order to 
prevent these from evading proper standards of conduct when operating in States that have not the will or 
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¶40 All Muslim countries ratifying CEDAW, except Mali and Tajikistan, made 
reservations based on perceived conflicts between the Convention and the shari’a.184  
Most of these reservations were substantive and it has been stated that of all UN human 
rights treaties, CEDAW “has attracted the greatest number of substantive reservations 
with the potential to modify or exclude most, if not all, of the terms of the treaty.”185 
Although CEDAW allows for reservations consistent with its object and purpose,186 it can 
be questioned whether all reservations stand the test of article 19(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that reservations may not be contrary to 
the purpose of a treaty or beyond the limits set by the treaty itself. 187  
¶41 All three countries are party to CEDAW188 and have made reservations to articles 2 
and 16 of the Convention. 189 Article 2 sets out how States should enforce CEDAW 
domestically.190 It requires amongst others that States “adopt appropriate legislative and 
other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination 
against women”191 and that “all appropriate measures, including legislation” be taken so 
as to “modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which 
constitute discrimination against women.”192 Both Egypt and Morocco have made a 
reservation stating that they will do nothing that conflicts with the shari’a, thereby 
limiting their commitment to the full implementation of the article.193 Tunisia has made a 
                                                                                                                                                 
the power to exact acceptable standards of conducting business with respect to the interests of its 
population, the environment, and so forth. On the accountability of private entities under international law, 
including on the basis of drittwirkung , see NICOLA M.C.P. JÄGERS, CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHT S 
OBLIGATIONS: IN SEARCH OF ACCOUNTABILITY (2002) and LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (M.T. Kamminga and S. Zia -Zarifi eds., 2002).  Louis Henkin makes a more 
general argument with reference to the applicability of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to non-
state entities: “Every individual and every organ of society excludes no one, no company, no market, no 
cyberspace. The Universal Declaration applies to them all.” Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 
and the Challenge of Global Markets, 1 BROOK. J. OF INT’L L. 17, 25 (1999). 
183 CEDAW, supra  note 124, at art. 5(a). 
184 Many non-Muslim countries made reservations as well, including most of the European Union. See 
Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 643 (1990). 
185 Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination 
Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 281, 317 (1991). 
186 CEDAW, supra note 124, at art. 28, § 2. 
187 Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties art. 19(c), Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; Cook, supra 
note 184, at 648-63; see also  Bharathi Anandhi Venkatra man, Islamic States and the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the Shari’a and the 
Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949 (1995) (surveying the reservations made by a number of 
Islamic states, including Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia). Venkatraman comes to the conclusion that the 
reservations made by these states were actually not necessary as the Convention is not in conflict with the 
shari’a  because the norms in CEDAW leave room for a certain measure of cultural relativism. Id. 
188 Egypt signed the Convention in 1980 and ratified it in 1981, Morocco acceded in 1993, and Tunisia 
signed it in 1980 and ratified it in 1985. See U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for 
the Advancement of Women, States Parties, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2007). 
189 See Clark, supra note 185. 
190 CEDAW, supra note 124, at art. 2. 
191 Id. at art. 2(b). 
192 Id. at art. 2(f). 
193 See Cook, supra note 184, at 687. 
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general declaration stating that it will not adopt legislation conflicting with the first 
chapter of the Tunisian constitution, which declares Islam to be the State religion. 194 
¶42 Article 16 deals with the family in particular.195 It lays down the equal freedom of 
men and women to enter into marriage and choose a spouse,196 the equal duties during 
marriage and divorce197 and equal rights with respect to children, including the right to 
decide the number and spacing of children. 198 Also, States Parties must set a minimum 
age for marriage in order to prevent child marriages.199  
¶43 Egypt and Morocco have made a reservation based on the concept of 
complementarity of the rights and duties of both spouses.200 The reservations are based on 
the rationale set out in section II.C, according to which the rights and duties of husband 
and wife are each other’s counterparts.201  From this point of view, the fact that the wife 
receives a dower as her personal property upon marriage and can receive maintenance 
after divorce, gives her a degree of leverage and independence that should balance out 
her husband’s unrestricted right to divorce.202 This has been referred to as an “innovative 
‘separate but equal’ argument,”203 portraying the Islamic concept of women’s equality in 
terms of complementary rights.  According to Rebecca Cook, a preeminent human rights 
scholar, framing the roles of men and women as different but of equal value may very 
well satisfy the requirements of the Convention. 204 
¶44 Tunisia makes no such elaborate argument; it simply has declared that the majority 
of the provisions of article 16205 must not conflict with its Law of Personal Status.206  This 
is arguably in contravention of the norm that forbids States to invoke their domestic 
legislation to excuse non-compliance with a treaty. 207 
¶45 Some criticism can be applied to all three countries’ reservations. Although cultural 
relativism is argued to be allowed up to a certain extent under CEDAW,208 religion may 
not be used to derogate from universal rights, as discussed with respect to the 
International Bill of Human Rights.209  One suggested solution is a narrower formulation 
of the reservations,210 which would make the domestic regulations more compatible with 
                                                 
194 Id.  
195 CEDAW, supra  note 124, at art. 16. 
196 Id. at art. 16, § 1 (a)-(b). 
197 Id. at art. 16, § 1 (c).  
198 Id. at art. 16, § 1 (d), (e), (f). 
199 Id. at art. 16, § 2. 
200 See U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for the Advancement of Women, 
Declarations, Reservations, and Objections to CEDAW, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007).  
201 See Al-Moqatei, supra note 21, at 11. 
202 Id.; Venkatraman, supra note 187, at 1960. 
203 Venkatraman, supra note 187, at 1960. 
204 Cook, supra note 184, at 704. 
205 The reservation applies to paragraphs c, d, f, g and h, dealing with the rights and responsibilities during 
marriage and divorce, rights regarding guardianship, and property rights. See CEDAW, supra note 124, at 
art. 16, § 1 (c). 
206 Id. 
207 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 187, at art. 27. 
208 See Venkatraman, supra note 187, at 2000-06. 
209 See UDHR, supra note 154. 
210 Venkatraman, supra note 187, at 2006-07. 
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the requirements of CEDAW, taking “a certain amount of cultural relativity” into account 
in its enforcement.211  
IV.  ANALYSIS OF PAST AND PRESENT LEGISLATION 
¶46 Having discussed in broad lines the Islamic rules on marriage and divorce as well 
as the constitutional and international legal provisions on the position of women in family 
law, this article will now discuss the law reforms in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.  
A. Egypt 
¶47 Egypt started codifying its reformed family law early in the twentieth century. 212 
Prior to that, Egyptian personal status law was based primarily on the Hanafi school of 
jurisprudence.213 Although the first laws combined elements from different schools, the 
Hanafi teachings were considered to be default rules in case no textual provision was 
available.214  
¶48 Although most of Egyptian law was secularized during the second half of the 
twentieth century, family law remained the domain of Islamic rules.215 The secularization 
can mainly be attributed to the reception of European laws216 and partly be considered as 
the legacy of British colonization from the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.217 In its turn, the secularization process has perhaps led to a more tenacious 
adherence to Islamic jurisprudence in family law. 218 Not only does the fact that the family 
plays a pivotal role in Muslim society make the reform of family law a controversial 
issue, it also has a symbolic meaning as the last bastion of more traditional principles in 
contrast to the sacrifice of traditional values for European concepts of law in other 
areas.219 
¶49 The most important laws on matters dealing with issues of personal status are Law 
No. 25 of 1920,220 Law No. 56 of 1923221 and Law No. 25 of 1929.222 These have been 
amended by Law No. 100 of 1985223 and recently by Personal Status Law No. 1 of 
                                                 
211 Id. at 2005. 
212 See Law No. 20 (1920) (Egypt); Anderson, Modern Trends, supra note 1, at 6. 
213 Anderson, Modern Trends, supra note 1, at 5. 
214 See Law No. 78 (1931) (Egypt). 
215 Anderson, Modern Trends, supra  note 1; J. N. D. Anderson, Law Reform in Egypt 1850-1950, in 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN EGYPT 209, 217-19 (P.M. Holt ed., 1968). 
216 See Daniel Crecelius, The Course of Secularization in Modern Egypt, in RELIGION AND POLITICAL 
MODERNIZATION 67 (Donald E. Smith ed., 1974). 
217 Id. 
218 See Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1043, 1047 (2004) (arguing that reforms in family law in Egypt have been structurally impaired because 
of the need to split the difference between progressive activists for women’s rights and the more 
conservative religious parties within society in any attempt for reform, and stating that “in order for all 
other laws to be secularized, family law had to represent the limit of, the exception to, the sacrificial lamb 
of secularization”). 
219 Id. 
220 Law Concerning the Provisions on and Certain Matters of Personal Status, No. 25 (1920) (Egypt). 
221 Law on Marriage Age, No. 56 (1923) (Egypt). 
222 Law Concerning Certain Provisions on Personal Status, No. 25 (1929) (Egypt). 
223 Personal Status (Amendment) Law, No. 100 (1985) (Egypt). 
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2000.224 As will be discussed shortly, an attempt in 1979 to more drastically amend the 
laws of 1920 and 1925 was declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds by the 
Supreme Constitutional Court in 1985.225 
¶50 Law No. 25 of 1920 codified the rules on maintenance and the wife’s petition for a 
judicial divorce in case of non-payment of maintenance or serious physical or 
psychological conditions of the husband.226  Maintenance was due even if the wife was 
sick or wealthy. 227 That maintenance included not only food, clothing and 
accommodation but also medical treatment was an innovation; under traditional law 
medical expenses were not explicitly recognized as maintenance.228 The entitlement to 
maintenance was lost in case the woman ceased to be a Muslim, either by choice or 
forced by circumstances, or if she left the matrimonial home without a valid reason and 
without “permission of her husband.”229 
¶51 If the man was ill or had any other impediment that would interfere with his sexual 
functions, the wife could petition for divorce.230 Another possibility was given in Law 
No. 25 of 1929.231  If the wife claimed that her husband had caused her harm or injury 
which made their living together as a couple impossible and no reconciliation was 
possible, she could request judicial divorce from a judge.232 Even though the concept of 
talaq left the decision on divorce mainly with the husband, these laws can be considered 
progressive to some extent as they deviated from a number of Hanafi teachings.233  
¶52 During the following decades, law reform took on a particularly slow pace.234 
Several attempts were made to restrict polygamy and the man’s unilateral decision to 
divorce, but with no success.235 The 1952 revolution under leadership of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser finally catalyzed a number of reforms, among which the recognition of equal 
rights of women and their right to vote in the 1956 constitution. 236 The 1959 Labor Law 
acknowledged women’s equality and women obtained positions in the cabinet.237  
However, efforts to extend these reforms to the field of family law proved to be very 
difficult.238 Several proposals were made, but never accepted due to either great religious 
and political resistance or external circumstances.239 Finally, President Anwar al-Sadat 
                                                 
224 Law on Reorganization of Certain Terms and Procedures of Litigation in Personal Status Matters, No. 1 
(2000) (Egypt) [hereinafter Egyptian Personal Status Law, No. 1]. 
225 The case was the result of Case no. 29/1980 Badari Court of Summary Justice for Guardianship of the 
Person, in which a woman filed for maintenance from her husband. See Fauzi M. Najjar, Egypt’s Laws of 
Personal Status, 10(3) ARAB STUD. Q. 319, 337 (1988). 
226 WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW, PERSPECTIVES ON REFORM 33 (Lynn Welchman ed., 




230 Id. (citing insanity and “the two kinds of leprosy” as examples of physical or psychological impairment 
of the husband as grounds for judicial divorce).  
231 WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW, supra note 226, at 34. 
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234 For an overview of the attempts to reform the Egyptian Personal Status Law, see Najjar, supra  note 225, 
at 320-23. 
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238 Id. 
239 Id. at 321-23. 
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issued a decree in 1979, promulgating Personal Status Law No. 44240 without prior 
approval of the people’s assembly.241 The law was confirmed 14 days later by an 
assembly in which the president’s party had the majority. 242 The law met great praise 
from liberals and feminists as well as critique from both conservatives and those who did 
not object as much to the content of the law but more to the way it was adopted.243 
¶53 Personal Status Law No. 44 provided a number of significant changes for women’s 
position in marriage and divorce.244 For example, a wife’s right to maintenance was no 
longer affected when she went to work without her husband’s consent, unless the work 
was against the interest of her family.245  A wife who otherwise refused to obey her 
husband still forfeited her right to maintenance, but the use of force to make her obey was 
prohibited.246  
¶54 The polygamous marriage of her husband was now also considered an injury for 
which the wife could petition for divorce.247 This was irrespective of whether she had 
stipulated anything in the marriage contract and the rule applied to both the first wife and 
the new wife from whom the fact that her husband was already married had been 
hidden. 248  
¶55 Talaq was restricted in the sense that a divorce had to be properly registered and 
did not take effect until the wife had been notified.249 If a wife was repudiated without her 
consent or any apparent cause on her part, she could receive an indemnity in addition to 
the legal maintenance.250  
¶56 A divorced woman received custody of her male children until the age of ten and 
her female children until they reached the age of twelve, with the possibility of extension 
up to fifteen for a son and until her marriage for a daughter.251 Custody of the children 
entailed the exclusive right to the matrimonial home for as long as the former husband 
had not provided for other suitable accommodation. 252  
¶57 Personal Status Law No. 44 was abolished by the Supreme Constitutional Court in 
1985 on grounds that the law had been declared by presidential decree during a period 
when the people’s assembly was not in session and had not been presented for approval 
when parliament reconvened, as required by the constitution. 253 This meant a return to the 
laws of the 1920’s, a situation quickly remedied by the adoption of Law No. 100 of 
                                                 
240 Personal Status Law, No. 44 (1979) (Egypt). The law was somewhat mockingly referred to as “Jihan’s 
Law” after the wife of the president who allegedly was very much in favor of its provisions.  
241 Najjar, supra note 225, at 323. 
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243 On the various objections raised, see Najjar, supra note 225, at 326-36. 
244 See WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW, supra note 226, at 33-34; supra pp. 29-30. 
245 Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 113. 
246 Personal Status Law, No. 44, supra note 240, at art. 6 (bb), see  Najjar, supra note 225, at 332. 
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248 ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 59. 
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250 Personal Status Law, No. 44, supra note 240, at art. 18 bis; see ESPOSITO, supra note 7, at 59. 
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Discrimination Against Women, 29, U.N. Doc. A/39/45 (1984)).  
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1985.254 In great lines, the 1985 law resembled Personal Status Law No. 44, but the 
setback for women on certain issues was significant.255 
¶58 The right of a wife to go out and work was restricted considerably;256 she could still 
go out and work, but only if it did not “appear that her use of this right [was] corrupted by 
abuse of the right” or that her husband had not asked her to refrain from exercising her 
right.257  Also, the injury caused by a husband marrying an additional wife was no longer 
considered a legal presumption; the injury now had to be proven. 258 The standard given to 
prove such injury was very subjective: a woman had to show that ‘women like her’ could 
no longer live together with her husband under the circumstances.259 Talaq would now 
take effect from the date it was uttered, but when a husband concealed the divorce from 
his wife, consequences in the area of inheritance and other financial rights took effect 
only from the day she obtained knowledge of it.260  
¶59 Over the years, the Egyptian government came to consider the law of 1985 as a 
“considerable embarrassment” on the international level and in the building of 
international economic relations.261 In addition, the Egyptian feminist movement did not 
stand for the situation and in 1998 a special committee was formed to draft a proposal of 
law reform.262 Law No. 1 of 2000 was adopted in January 2000.263 
¶60 Under Law No. 1 a wife has the right to petition for divorce without having to 
prove injury by returning the dower given to her.264 No injury or incompatibility needs to 
be proven, but she must affirm that there is no way for them to continue married life.265 
Talaq only takes effect as opposed to the wife when it can be confirmed by witnesses and 
documentation. 266 It is expressly stated in the explanatory memorandum, however, that 
this only pertains to its legal effects; the talaq may still have its religious effect.267 As 
Lynn Welchman, a prominent Islamic and Middle Eastern law scholar, points out,268 this 
may very well place women in a difficult position. A man may divorce his wife without 
the presence of witnesses, not register the talaq and thereby prevent her from marrying 
someone else after her iddah has passed.269 He may even deny having divorced her all 
together.270 
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¶61 A woman may try and prove her husband’s revocation of talaq by any means.271 If 
she is the one to deny the revocation, her husband can however only prove his claim if he 
has informed her with an official document of revocation within the iddah period.272  
¶62 In both talaq and judicial divorce, the court has to attempt to reconcile spouses 
before ruling on a divorce.273 When the couple has children, the court is to offer 
reconciliation at least two times, which have to be at least thirty and not more than sixty 
days apart.274   
B. Morocco 
¶63 As in the case of Egypt, Morocco’s family law is the only part of its code that is 
still based on Islamic law. 275  A comprehensive codification and law reform project was 
first undertaken in 1957 and 1958, when a special commission set down the rules 
developed within the shari’a courts during colonization. 276 The Law of Personal Status or 
Mudawwana consisted of six books. 277 It was mainly based on the Maliki school and the 
first two books dealt with marriage and divorce.278  Over the years, some reforms have 
been made but none as dramatic as the adoption of the new Moroccan family law in 
2004.279 One of the driving forces behind the development of the code was the Moroccan 
royal house.280  The process of reform, set into motion by King Muhammad VI’s father 
King Hassan II in the late 1990’s, was given an unexpected impetus by the bomb attacks 
in Casablanca in 2003.281 In October 2003, the King delivered a speech to the Moroccan 
parliament in which he showed his determination to present an alternative version of the 
radical Islam connected to the bombings.282 He laid out the main points of the new law, 
referring to Quranic verses to underline its compatibility with the shari’a and also made it 
quite clear that his authority was supreme, implying that parliament better not set aside 
his urging to adopt the new law. 283  
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http://www.mincom.gov.ma/english/generalities/speech/2003/ParliamentFallSession101003.htm (last 
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¶64 The family code starts with a preamble which incorporates the eleven fundamental 
reforms King Muhammad laid out before parliament: 1) the adoption of a modern form of 
wording and the removal of degrading and debasing terms for women; 2) the freedom of 
women to arrange their own marriage (thus abolishing the mandatory intervention of a 
wali or guardian) ; 3) equality between men and women with respect to the minimum age 
for marriage; 4) allowing polygamy only under stringent restrictions; 5) the simplification 
of marriage procedures for Moroccans living abroad; 6) making divorce equally available 
to men and women; 7) the expansion of a woman’s right to divorce when the husband 
does not fulfill the conditions in the marriage contract; 8) protection of children’s 
interests with respect to custody; 9) the acknowledgement of paternity of children born 
out of registered marriage; 10) equality in matters of inheritance; 11) the possibility to 
make arrangements for property acquired during marriage.284 
¶65 Under the new law, the family is the joint responsibility of both spouses,285 while 
under the previous legislation the family was the responsibility of the husband.286 This 
included full financial responsibility.287 In return, the wife was held to obey her 
husband.288 In the new code the stipulation that the wife should obey her husband has 
been removed and she must now also contribute to household expenses.289 A wife can 
also no longer request a divorce on the basis of lack of financial support if she has 
sufficient means to support herself and her husband has no financial means.290   
¶66 Polygamy is forbidden when there is a risk of inequity between the wives.291 
Authorization from the court is needed and is refused if “an exceptional objective 
justification is not proven” or if the man does not have the sufficient resources to support 
both families.292  When the husband makes his petition to the court, his first wife is 
informed and invited to attend the hearing. 293 If the court grants permission for the second 
marriage, this may not take place before the future wife has been informed about the fact 
that her husband to be is already married.294 The current wife may request a divorce and 
the court can award her a sum of money as compensation. 295 If the husband does not pay 
the sum, this is considered as a withdrawal of the petition for authorization of 
polygamy. 296 The former legislation did not require the authorization of a judge; however, 
a husband was required to inform his wife of his decision to marry again and tell his 
potential bride that he was already married.297 
¶67 The conclusion of her marriage contract by anyone else is something the woman 
has to delegate expressly.298 As opposed to the former legislation, under which a woman 
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needed the consent of her guardian, 299 the new law states that “marriage tutelage is the 
woman’s right, which she exercises upon reaching majority according to her choice and 
interests.”300 
¶68 Talaq is made conditional upon the court’s consent.301 This is a considerable 
limitation as opposed to the virtually unrestricted right of the husband to repudiate his 
wife under the previous legislation. 302  As under the Egyptian law, the law prescribes the 
adherence to the Quranic principle that the court should attempt to have the spouses 
reconcile.303 Before the divorce can be registered the husband must pay all the money he 
owes his wife, including any delayed dower, maintenance for the iddah and a so-called 
“consolation gift” which is assessed on the basis of the length of the marriage, the 
financial position of the husband, the reason for the repudiation and the extent to which 
the husband has abused his right.304 During the period of iddah the wife is to stay in the 
marital home or suitable alternative accommodation. 305 Otherwise, the court determines a 
fixed sum to cover the housing expenses.306 
¶69 Either spouse or both spouses together may petition for divorce on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences.307 Divorce by mutual consent under judicial supervision did 
not exist under the old law. 308 A reconciliation effort should be undertaken by two 
arbitrators or two other persons fit for the task, but the suit has to be settled within no 
more than six months after the petition for divorce was filed.309 
¶70 Under the old family law a wife could only petition for divorce on limited grounds: 
harm caused by her husband—which was very difficult to prove in court—non-
maintenance, a defect in her husband, absence of the husband for more than a year in an 
unknown location and without valid justification, or an oath of abstinence taken by the 
husband.310 The other option would be for her to buy herself free from the marriage by 
returning (part of) the dower or by other means of compensation. 311 The new family law 
allows petition for divorce also if the husband does not comply with any one of the 
conditions in the marriage contract;312 failure to comply with any condition in the 
marriage contract is considered to constitute a harm that justifies a divorce request.313  A 
harm can be established by any means of proof and if the wife does not succeed, she can 
resort to the irreconcilable differences procedure.314 
¶71 Finally, an innovative feature with respect to custody is that under certain 
circumstances a woman can retain custody of her children if she remarries or moves away 
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from the area where her former husband lives.315  Custody is exercised until both sons and 
daughters reach the age of legal majority. 316 Also, it is specifically stipulated that children 
should get suitable accommodation, consistent with the living conditions when the 
parents were still married.317 This is a separate arrangement from the maintenance 
obligations.318  
¶72 In sum, the new family law provides for some progressive changes as opposed to 
the old legislation. It remains to be seen, however, how great the practical effect of the 
reform will be. Much depends on the acceptance and application of the new law by the 
judiciary as well as the use that will be made of loopholes such as article 400319 which 
allows religious principles to be applied under certain circumstances. Such issues will be 
addressed further in Part V. 
C. Tunisia 
¶73 Tunisia adopted a Personal Status Law right after independence.320 The Majalla 
was first adopted in 1956321 and was based on both Maliki and Hanafi principles.322 Its 
last major reform was in 1993.323 
¶74 The two most progressive features of the Tunisian Personal Status Law are its 
abolition of polygamy and extrajudicial divorce.324 No restrictions or conditions are given 
to permit polygamy under any circumstances, it is simply stated that “polygamy is 
prohibited,”325 followed by the punishment by law incurred when acting contrary to this 
provision. 326  
¶75 The rationale behind the abolition of polygamy finds its roots in the Quranic verse 
stating that one can only marry several wives if they receive equal treatment.327 
According to the legislature this condition is humanly impossible to fulfill.328 Hence, 
polygamy is forbidden. 329 
                                                 
315 Id. at arts. 174, 175, 178. 
316 Id. at art. 166. 
317 Id. at art. 171. 
318 Id. at art. 168. 
319 Id. at art. 400 (“For all issues not addressed by a text in the present code, reference may be made to the 
Maliki School of Jurisprudence and to ijtihad which strive to fulfill and enhance Islamic values, notably 
justice, equality and amicable social relations.”). 
320 Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 129; AYA CHERIF CHAMARI, LA FEMME ET LA LOI EN TUNISIE (1991) 
(“Les femmes tunisiennes sont généralement considérées comme étant les plus émancipées dans le monde 
arabo-musulman.” [Tunisian women are generally considered as the most emancipated in the Arab-Muslim 
world]). That this perception may be based on a legal fiction will be briefly discussed in Part V.   
321 CODE DU STATUT PERSONNEL [CODE OF PERSONAL STATUS] (Tunis.) [hereinafter TUNISIAN CODE OF 
PERSONAL STATUS]. 
322 CHARRAD, supra note 3, at 218-31. 
323 TUNISIAN CODE OF PERSONAL STATUS, supra note 321. 
324 Id. at arts. 18, 29-33.     
325 Id. at art. 18.   
326 Id. 
327 Qur’an 4:3; supra  note 18. 
328 Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 129; J. N. D. Anderson, The Tunisian Law of Personal Status, 7 INT’L 
& COMP . L.Q. 262, 268 (1958). 
329 Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 129; Anderson, The Tunisian Law of Personal Status, supra  note 328, 
at 268. 
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¶76 In similar simple fashion article 30 provides that “Divorce shall only take place in 
court,”330 thereby restricting the use of unilateral talaq by the husband.331  The same 
article in the 1957 law read: “Divorce outside a court of law is without legal effect.”332 
The different choice of wording may imply an attempt to prevent a situation as suggested 
could happen under the current Egyptian law – a man divorcing his wife in the religious 
but not judicial sense, thus making her situation practically impossible.333 
¶77 Divorce can be granted upon request of either the husband or wife on grounds 
specified in the law, by mutual agreement of the spouses, or if one of the spouses insists 
on grounds other than those specified in the Personal Status Law, in which case the court 
determines the compensation to be paid by the insisting spouse.334 As in the two codes 
discussed before, the court first has to ascertain that no possibility of reconciliation 
between the spouses exists.335 If there are minor children, at least three reconciliation 
hearings must be held.336 Upon divorce, custody can be awarded to either spouse, keeping 
the best interest of the child in mind.337 
¶78 Although the provision on the mutual duties of husband and wife of the 1957 law 
already included the obligation of the wife to contribute to the household if she had 
private means – considered in fair balance with “the advantages assured to her by the new 
legislation,”338 including that the husband had no rights over his wife’s property339 – it 
took until 1993 for the obligation of obedience to be removed from the code and be 
replaced by “a mutual duty between husband and wife” in managing family affairs.340 
¶79 The main rationale behind this reform was the suppression of domestic violence, a 
grave problem in Tunisia.341 Considering the otherwise progressive approach taken in the 
codification of family law and the way Islamic rules have been interpreted in the process, 
it seems surprising that it took so long for this amendment to take place.342 The delay can 
possibly be ascribed to the difficult socio-economic situation in the country, in 
combination with the growing strength of the conservative and religious factions.343  
D. A Brief Comparative Assessment 
¶80 The question first and foremost should be by which standard to assess the extent to 
which these recent law reforms have improved the situation of women in their respective 
countries. As we are dealing with family codes based on shari’a, it would hardly make 
sense to measure it against current Western models of family law, for these codes are 
                                                 
330 TUNISIAN CODE OF PERSONAL STATUS, supra note 321, at art. 30.   
331 Id. 
332 Anderson , The Tunisian Law of Personal Status, supra  note 328, at 271. 
333 See WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW, supra  note 226, at 68. 
334 TUNISIAN CODE OF PERSONAL STATUS, supra note 321, at art. 31. 
335 Id. at art. 32. 
336 Id. 
337 Id. at art. 67. 
338 Anderson, The Tunisian Law of Personal Status, supra note 328, at 270. 
339 TUNISIAN CODE OF PERSONAL STATUS, supra note 321, at art. 24.  
340 Id. at art. 23; See Mayer, supra  note 3, at 432-46. 
341 Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 133. 
342 On the political forces driving the law reforms leading to the 1956 Code of Personal Status and the 
subsequent loss of momentum, see CHARRAD, supra note 3, at 218-32; Venkatraman, supra note 187, at 
1981-82. 
343 Id.  
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based on a different type of philosophy as has been set out earlier. The argument made by 
countries like Egypt and Morocco with respect to their reservations to CEDAW, in that 
balance can be found in other ways than a strict interpretation of formal equal treatment, 
is worth consideration. 344 However, this argument is also potentially dangerous as it could 
negate the extent to which social patterns, patriarchal structures and sexual stereotypes 
influence our views on what is considered so inherently different between men and 
women, besides a number of biological characteristics.  
¶81 A reassessment of what defines “balance” and complementarity between marriage 
partners should be possible. After all, a lot has changed since these countries first 
codified their family law, both on the national and international plane. By no means does 
this article argue that the standards shared among a great number of what are referred to 
as Western States are the only guidelines to go by, but if we have any belief in what is 
written in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – to which, after all, the majority 
of countries adhere – that human rights are inalienable and universal, a “separate but 
equal” doctrine just falls short. 
¶82 From this point of view, both the Egyptian and the Moroccan code fall short where 
it comes to the possibility of both husband and wife to obtain divorce.345 Although the 
restrictions the Egyptian and Moroccan legislature placed upon the use of talaq is a step 
in the right direction, the Tunisian code, which makes divorce equally accessible to men 
and women under the same conditions, would be preferable.346  Naturally, it all depends 
on how such regulations work out in practice, but merely looking at the legal provisions 
the Tunisian legislation seems to offer the highest degree of equality. 347 There is little 
problem in the fact that divorce is only allowed on specific grounds.348 Besides the fact 
that the so-called no fault divorce is a relatively recent development and its merits have 
not yet been fully assessed, the critical point of discussion here is that the options are 
equally available to both marriage partners, not so much what the exact options are.349 By 
contrast, the possibilities offered to a woman under Egyptian and Moroccan law—the 
possibility to buy her way out of a marriage, or request a divorce within a stringent set of 
limitations when the consent of her spouse cannot be obtained—cannot be equated with 
the husband’s unfettered discretionary ability to get a divorce, even if he has to do so 
officially before a court.350  
¶83 All codes have placed restrictions on marital age and none explicitly require 
consent from a father or guardian. 351 Again, this says nothing about the practical reality, 
especially since the minimum age for marriage in Egypt and Tunisia is lower for women 
                                                 
344 See, e.g., A l-Moqatei supra note 21, at 11; Venkatraman, supra note 189, at 1960-61; Cook, supra note 
186, at 704. 
345 Egyptian Personal Status Law No. 1, supra note 224, at arts. 20-21; see also MOROCCAN FAMILY CODE 
OF 2004, supra note 279, at arts. 79, 98-99. 





351 Both men and women have to be 18 years of age in Morocco. MOROCCAN FAMILY CODE OF 2004, supra 
note 279, at art. 19.  In Egypt, the minimum age for marriage is 18 for men and 16 for women, Egyptian 
Personal Status Law No. 1, supra note 224, at art. 17, and in Tunisia men can get married at 20 and women 
at 17, TUNISIAN CODE OF PERSONAL STATUS, supra note 321, at art. 5. 
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than for men. 352 Even if women are allowed to conclude their own marriage contract, the 
difference in age could constitute a significant distortion in the balance of bargaining 
power with the possible result of a disadvantageous content of the marriage contract. 
Many factors could cause this, such as the fact that the girl is insufficiently aware of her 
options due to her young age, inexperience with the process of negotiation, or 
dependence on the advice of elders who may not necessarily have the interests most 
important for the girl in mind. It is hard to see how it might occur to a 16 year old girl 
that she may want to work at some point in her life or to resist the pressure of her family 
and peers not to include a corresponding clause in her marriage contract. This is not to 
underestimate the maturity of mind some people may have at a young age, but it will 
already be difficult for an 18 year old to make decisions concerning what should be a life-
long commitment, let alone for someone of a younger age facing a bargaining partner 
who is at least some years her senior. 
¶84 When it comes to rights and duties during marriage and upon divorce, Tunisia and 
Morocco are at the forefront although striking out the wife’s obedience requirement in 
Tunisia as late as 1993 was a bit tardy. 353 The lack of clarity as to whether a wife can go 
to work without her husband’s consent under the current Egyptian law354 is a serious 
defect, even though the formal requirement of obedience can no longer be found in the 
law. 355 Morocco is behind on Tunisia though, when one accepts the argument that 
polygamy ipso facto results in unequal treatment of multiple wives.356 The requirement of 
permission from the court does make the procedure more onerous for a husband wanting 
to marry a new wife and gives the existing wife the opportunity to “opt out,” but this does 
not change the fact that the wife will always have this possibility looming over her.357 She 
may be able to get out of the marriage, but this does not mean the situation is favorable 
for her, losing the status of a married woman as well as possibly the comfort of her home 
and custody over her children. 358 The situation under Egyptian law, requiring the wife to 
request the divorce herself, even if the second marriage is assumed to be a harm, is even 
more adverse for her.359  
¶85 The award of custody on the basis of the best interest of the child, as found in the 
Tunisian legislation, leaves the judge more flexibility to determine what is better for the 
children after the divorce instead of the automatic assignment of custody to either the 
mother or father.360 The Moroccan law has the advantage of allowing the children to stay 
with their mother until they are mature, in some cases including when the mother 
remarries.361  
¶86 Keeping in mind the principle of balance between the spouses, a wife’s right to 
work while adhering to the husband’s obligation to provide maintenance might be 
                                                 
352 Id. 
353 See supra note 342 and accompanying text.  
354 WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW, supra note 226, at 70-71. 
355 See id.  The husband can stipulate in the marriage contract that his wife is not allowed to go out to work, 
but according to jurisprudence of the constitutional court, he can only do this prior to the marriage. See id. 
356 See MOROCCAN FAMILY CODE OF 2004, supra note 279, arts. 40-41. 
357 See id. at arts. 45-46. 
358 See id. at arts. 166, 171, 174-75. 
359 Egyptian Personal Status Law No. 1, supra note 224, at art. 20. 
360 Again, in practice the outcome may turn out differently, as it appears that courts generally tend to favor 
the mother. See Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 2, at 130. 
361 See MOROCCAN FAMILY CODE OF 2004, supra note 279, at arts. 166, 171, 174-75.  
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regarded as problematic. The Tunisian and Moroccan law attempt to restore balance by 
requiring the wife to contribute to the household when she has the means to do so.362 A 
possible solution might be to express the maintenance obligations in a gender-neutral 
fashion or to qualify them so as to have each spouse contribute according to their 
capacity. It would fit well with the mutual obligations for the family as formulated so 
explicitly in the Moroccan code and would still leave ample room for the traditional 
division of roles. If the wife’s main task is to take care of the children and the household, 
the man’s is to provide financial maintenance. Naturally, this division of responsibility 
could also be made part of the marriage contract. There would need to be ample 
safeguards, however, to ensure that women do not end up shouldering both the burden of 
the household and maintenance.  
¶87 The reform in each country reflects a step forward to a certain degree. In the case of 
Egypt, steps are taken most cautiously; the autonomy of women is still not very great 
although the situation significantly improved as opposed to previous legislation. 363 The 
fact that the law reform was the result of an extensive debate within society and the 
government alike may offer potential for future reforms. Morocco’s form of government 
allows more dramatic changes to take place, as has been pointed out above when 
discussing the role the royal house has played in the law reform.364 There are still some 
significant improvements to be made, but the new family law is an important step 
forward.365 Tunisia’s family law remains the most progressive in the aspects discussed 
here.366 However, the momentum for further progress seems to have been lost after the 
proclamation of the first personal status law. 367 In addition, there is the issue of 
discrepancy between practice and theory, discussed in the following section.  
V. SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
¶88 The practical effect of these law reforms has not been easy to assess. A number of 
factors could hamper their implementation. 
¶89 First, courts in all three countries are known to fall back on the shari’a in case the 
law does not provide ample rules to deal with the situation at hand.368 This opens the door 
to revert to those rules the new legislation aimed to override. How great this risk is, 
would depend on the familiarity of judges with the contents of the new legislation and 
perhaps even a willingness to apply it.  
¶90 A second issue is the familiarity of women with their position under the law. Issues 
such as illiteracy and more generally the availability of information – which is more 
likely to play a role in rural areas than in big cities – can prevent women from claiming 
whatever rights they have under the law due to the mere fact that they are unaware of 
                                                 
362 See id. at arts. 187-88; TUNISIAN CODE OF PERSONAL STATUS, supra note 321, at arts. 23, 24.  
363 See supra Part IV.A. 
364 See Bordat & Kouzi, supra note 280. 
365 See supra Part IV.B. 
366 See supra Part IV.C. 
367 CHARRAD, supra note 3, at 218-32. 
368 Article 6 of Law No. 462/1055 and Article 280 of Law No. 78/1931 of Egypt and Article 400 of the 
Moroccan Family Code go as far as prescribing the default application of shari’a . Tunisian courts have also 
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their existence.369 Human rights lawyer Michelle Brandt and founder of the ePolicy 
Group Jeffrey Kaplan cite that in 1981 at least 51% of Tunisian women were unaware of 
the country’s family code.370 This has been followed up with an extensive program to 
combat illiteracy in the country, so the numbers may very well have improved since.371  
¶91 Third, the influence of societal structure and traditional role patterns should not be 
underestimated. Expectations within the immediate family and ideas formed by one’s 
upbringing are hard to negate. Issues such as economic underdevelopment and resurgence 
of Islamic fundamentalism can also have a detrimental effect on the choices available or 
the liberty in making them.  Tunisian lawyer Alya Cherif Chamari stresses the 
discrepancy between the perceived emancipated position of Tunisian women as it is laid 
down by law and their real position in society. She questions whether in such case there 
really can be talk of ‘emancipation’ of women: 
“A l’évidence, les lois régissant le statut des femmes dans la famille sont 
beaucoup plus protectrices qu’égalitaires. Si le législateur a supprimé les 
inégalitées les plus flagrantes, tels la polygamie, la répudiation, le «djabr», 
il n’en a pas moins conforté les rôles traditionnels de l’homme et de la 
femme dans la sphère familiale.  
D’ailleurs, le discours politique officiel qui a accompagné les réformes 
«émancipatrices» a toujours rappelé à la femme que son «émancipation» 
ne devait pas lui faire perdre de vue le rôle traditionnel d’épouse et de 
mère, tous les autres rôles qu’elle serait amenée à avoir en tant que 
citoyenne, travailleuse, syndicaliste ne pouvant être que secondaires. 
C’est ainsi que le législateur tunisien a conforté les structures familiales, 
conformément au modèle patriarcal traditionnel, en instituant la famille 
légitime dominée par l’hégémonie masculine et mettant la femme en 
situation de dépendance permanente, qu’elle soit fille, épouse ou mère. 
Dans ces conditions, comment peut-on encore parler d’émancipation?"372 
¶92 Finally, there can be several issues that pertain to the countries specifically. The 
uncertainty regarding the limits of the marriage contract in Egypt, previously discussed 
would be one example.373 A frequent criticism on the Moroccan reform is the creation of 
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separate family courts in too small a number to be able to adequately deal with all matters 
brought before them.374 It has been suggested that this separation from the general courts 
could result in a lower standard of justice in cases of family law. 375 The validity of this 
argument is hard to assess as specialization can have its advantages with respect to speed 
and efficiency. It is also not uncommon to have courts divided up in specialized 
chambers. Nevertheless, this is something that should be closely monitored. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶93 As far as the letter of the law is concerned, the law reforms do represent a step 
forward for women when it comes to marriage and divorce. A number of caveats have to 
be kept in mind with respect to the effect these reforms may have in reality, but as 
interesting and urgent a question as this may be, it falls outside the scope of this article.  
¶94 Tunisia may be the only exception when it comes to reforms quantity-wise, but the 
deletion of the obedience principle is a qualitative improvement and its code was already 
quite advanced to begin with. 376 Morocco has made the greatest stride forwards compared 
to its old family law, although the establishment of a separate family court system may or 
may not contribute very positively.377 Egypt has made some improvement, placing certain 
restrictions on polygamy and the uncontrolled use of talaq.378 However, there are serious 
loopholes in the law and divorce is still not as easily accessible for women as it is for 
men. This applies to Morocco as well.379 
¶95 All in all, “early reformer”380 Tunisia comes out best when looking at the freedom 
of women to enter into marriage, their obligations during marriage, access to divorce and 
their position upon divorce.381  However, both Tunisia and Egypt make a distinction 
between men and women in marital age that could negate much of the positive 
developments in the law, as it constitutes an inequality in bargaining power with respect 
to the marriage contract.382 All three countries no longer mention the wife’s duty of 
obedience, which is a positive development, but the possible restrictions that can be 
placed on the wife’s movement by forbidding her to work, as can be done under Egyptian 
family law, are negative.383  
¶96 The fact that the reforms are moving in the right direction does not mean that the 
codes as they stand – in particular those of Egypt and Morocco – do not leave much to be 
desired. Tunisia was right to abolish polygamy completely since the reasons why it was 
encouraged are no longer valid today. 384 The restriction placed on it by the Moroccan 
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code is commendable, but should be the prelude to abolishment.385 Egypt should do the 
same. 
¶97 The Tunisian divorce arrangement can be a model for other countries. Both Egypt 
and Morocco have increased the possibilities for a woman to obtain a divorce and 
restricted the husband’s use of talaq,386 but the systems for men and women remain 
separate and disadvantageous for women. 387 As set out above, a separate but equal 
doctrine does not appear to work.    
¶98 It should be possible to amend the law and still adhere to the Quranic principle of 
balance between the spouses. If awarding the wife equal footing when it comes to 
freedom of movement during marriage, access to divorce, and right of custody of the 
children is considered to distort the balance of mutual duties and obligations, an option 
could be created for the wife to “counterbalance” her increased independence by, for 
example, requiring her to contribute to the household expenses if she goes out to work. 
Such a regulation could leave ample room for the traditional arrangement the drafters of 
the original codes had in mind, in which the wife took care of the house and the family 
and the husband provided her with the money to do so.  But it could also allow for a 
somewhat more modern arrangement in which both spouses work and contribute to the 
household costs according to their ability.  This should be provided solely as an option, 
not a general rule; there can be many reasons why a woman would choose not to work,388 
but should she want to, she should be able to make that choice. Tunisia’s and Morocco’s 
provisions on the woman’s obligation to contribute financially if she has the means to do 
so allude to this,389 and it is an idea that should be taken into consideration in future law 
reforms. 
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